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*Bail—Right of Sureties to Arrest Principal in Another State.*—The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in *State v. Lingerfelt*, 14 S. E. Rep. 75, decided that the sureties on a bail bond given in Tennessee had a right, in person or by agent, to arrest their absconding principal in North Carolina. The court said, "It is insisted that the 'bail only represents the court from which his authority emanates, and, where the court has no power to arrest, the bail has no power to arrest.' Such, indeed, is the language of Mr. Wharton (3 Crim. Law, § 2976), but the only authority he cites is from Canada, where it was held that the bail could not follow his principal from New York, and arrest him in the British dominions. This, it was said, would be dangerous to the national independence of Canada. As between the States, however, a different rule applies, and the distinction is sustained by the highest authority." Quoting from *Nicolls v. Ingersoll*, 7 Johns. 145, the court said: "The bail-piece is not process, nor anything in the nature of it, but is merely a record or memorial of the delivery of the principal to his bail on security given. It cannot be questioned but that bail in the common pleas would have a right to go into any other county in the State to take his principal. This shows that the jurisdiction of the court in no way controls the authority of the bail, and as little can the jurisdiction of the State affect this right as between the bail and his principal."

*Responsibility of Railroad Companies in Carrying Dogs.*—*Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Higdon*, 10 South. Rep. 282 (Ala.) was an action against a railroad to recover damages for the loss of a dog. The plaintiff boarded the defendant's train with his dog. The conductor told him that he must put the dog in the baggage car, which he did, leaving it in charge of the baggage-master. Arrived at his destination, he demanded the dog of the baggage-master, who refused to deliver it to him except on payment of twenty-five cents. This the plaintiff declined to pay, and the dog was carried on and lost. Neither the conductor nor the baggage-master had told the plaintiff of a rule of the railroad prohibiting the carrying of dogs, except so far as its employees choose to be personally responsible for them, nor did the plaintiff know of this regulation. The court said: "A rule of which the passenger has no notice cannot have effect to relieve the railroad company of responsibility for an article accepted for carriage by an employee who is intrusted with the duty of receiving and taking charge of goods delivered for transportation, and who accepts the article in question apparently in the course of his employment and on behalf of the principal."